ISSN:
1573-2878
Keywords:
Self-interest maximization
;
self-interest stable solutions
;
self-interest cooperative games
;
self-interest noncooperative games
;
monotonic games
;
decomposition theory
;
reframing game payoffs
;
full cooperation
;
targeted solutions
;
Pareto optimality
;
collective group interest
;
stability
;
structural departure
;
incentives for adopting a new game
;
habitual domain
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
Notes:
Abstract Human beings have a prevailing drive to achieve their self-interest goals or equilibrium states, which may subsume their social interests. An ideal working environment or cooperative game situation would be one in which each participant or player maximizes his/her own interest while maximizing his/her contribution to the collective group interest. This paper addresses the feasibility, methods, and bounds for reframing a generaln-person game into an ideal game in which full cooperation or a targeted solution can be induced and maintained by the players' self-interest maximization. Criteria for good reframing are introduced. Monotonic games, self-interest cooperative and noncooperative games, and a decomposition theory of general games are also introduced to facilitate the study. It is shown that everyn-person game can be written as the sum of a self-interest cooperative game and a self-interest noncooperative game. Everyn-person game can be reframed so that full cooperation can be achieved by the players' self-interest maximization. Everyn-person game can be reframed so that a targeted solution can be obtained and maintained through the players' self-interest maximization.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00934528
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