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  • 1
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    Dordrecht : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Theory and Decision. 21:2 (1986:Sept.) 155 
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 37 (1994), S. 245-265 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Tournament ; uncovered set
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper proposes and justifies a natural way to weaken the concept of covering relation defined on a finite tournament. Various weak covering relations, calledk-covering relations, are introduced. To eachk-covering relation corresponds a strong uncovered set containing all nonk-covered outcomes. It is proved that those strong uncovered sets may be empty. Moreover, the set of all tournaments having an empty strong uncovered set is characterized within two rather large classes of tournaments. Finally, we offer a complete study of the cases where the directed graph defined by ak-covering relation coincides with the initial tournament.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 49 (2000), S. 249-287 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Majority voting ; Preference extension rule ; Lexicographic order
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We characterize two lexicographic-type preference extension rules from a set X to the set Ψ of all orders on this set. Elements of X are interpreted as basic economic policy decisions, whereas elements of Ψ are conceived as political programs among which a collectivity has to choose through majority voting. The main axiom is called tournament-consistency, and states that whenever majority pairwise comparisons based on initial preferences on X define an order on X, then this order is also chosen by a majority among all other orders in Ψ. Tournament-consistency thus allows to predict the outcome of majority voting upon orders from the knowledge of majority preferences on their components.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 13 (1996), S. 75-93 
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper introduces a new axiom for choice in preference profiles and tournaments, called composition-consistency. A social choice function is composition-consistent if it is non-sensitive to the cloning of one or several outcomes. The key feature of the composition consistency property is an operation concept called multiple composition product of profiles. The paper provides a brief overview of some social choice functions studied in the literature. Concerning the tournament solutions, it is proved that the Top Cycle, the Slater and the Copeland solutions are not composition-consistent, whereas the Banks, Uncovered Set, TEQ, Minimal Covering Set are composition-consistent. Moreover, we define the composition-consistent hull of a solution ф as the smallest composition-consistent solution containing ф. The composition-consistent hulls of the Top cycle and Copeland solutions are specified, and we give some hints about the location of the hull of the Slater set. Concerning social choice functions, it is shown that Kemeny, Borda and Minimax social choice functions are not composition-consistent, whereas the Paretian one is composition-consistent. Moreover, we prove that the latter is the composition-consistent hull of the Borda and Minimax functions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 21 (1986), S. 155-161 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper is a first attempt to study the problem of aggregation of individual ordinal probabilistic beliefs in an Arrowian framework. We exhibit some properties an aggregation rule must fulfil; in particular we prove the existence of a “quasi-dictator”.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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