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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 9 (1996), S. 97-113 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games without spillovers. We find that population monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, when the payoff of a player changes monotonically when the size of the group of players choosing the same strategy increases, are crucial to obtain the equivalence of these two solution concepts. We identify the classes of games, satisfying population monotonicity properties, which yield the equivalence of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the set of strong Nash equilibria. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equivalence result even when the population monotonicity assumptions are relaxed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213445
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (1997)
    Springer
    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 97-113 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games withoutspillovers. We find thatpopulation monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, when the payoff of a player changes monotonically when the size of the group of players choosing the same strategy increases, are crucial to obtain the equivalence of these two solution concepts. We identify the classes of games, satisfying population monotonicity properties, which yield the equivalence of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the set of strong Nash equilibria. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equivalence result even when the population monotonicity assumptions are relaxed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213445
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power (1995)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 12 (1995), S. 43-58 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Blair and Pollak (Econometrica (1982) 50: 931–943) prove that, if there are more alternatives than individuals, then, for every arrovian binary decision rule that is acyclic, there is at least one individual who has a veto power over a critical number of pairs of alternatives. If the number of individuals is larger than the number of alternatives, there need not be single vetoers but there could be small coalitions endowed with a similar power. Kelsey (Soc Choice Welfare (1985) 2: 131–137) states precise results in this respect. In this paper, we first give a new and much simpler proof of the main result of Blair and Pollak and complete proofs of the generalization of this result by Kelsey. Then we give a precise answer as to the minimum size of the coalitions that must have a veto power under any acyclic binary decision rule and the minimum number of pairs of alternatives on which these coalitions may exercise their power. We also show that, if the veto power of the coalitions of the minimal size attainable under the last objective is limited to the minimum number of pairs of alternatives, then all larger coalitions have a veto power on all pairs. All the results are obtained by appealing to an acyclicity condition found by Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory (1979) 21: 28–45). In the case of symmetric and monotonic binary decision rules, proofs are even easier and illustrate clearly the reasons for the veto power.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00182192
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments (1996)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 13 (1996), S. 451-455 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this note we prove a McGarvey theorem for the family of Separable Tournaments. This family arises in the analysis of Logrolling and Vote Trading in Committees.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00182855
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments (1996)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 13 (1996), S. 451-455 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract.  In this note we prove a McGarvey theorem for the family of Separable Tournaments. This family arises in the analysis of Logrolling and Vote Trading in Committees.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050043
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A social choice function implementable via backward induction with values in the ultimate uncovered set (1999)
    Springer
    Review of economic design 4 (1999), S. 153-160 
    Details
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: JEL classification:D70, D71, D78 ; Key words:Implementation via backward induction, Condorcet social choice function, ultimate uncovered set, binary voting procedure, majority-rule tournament
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We prove the existence of a social choice function implementable via backward induction which always selects within the ultimate uncovered set. Whereas the uncovered set is the set of maximal elements of the covering relation, the ultimate uncovered set is the set obtained by iterative application of this covering operation. Dutta and Sen (1993) showed that any social choice function which is the solution of a generalized binary voting procedure is implementable via backward induction. Our result follows from Dutta and Sen's theorem, in that we construct a binary voting procedure always selecting within the ultimate uncovered set. We use the classical multistage elimination procedure, which always selects an alternative within the uncovered set. When this procedure is also used to select among all of the possible agendas or orderings of alternatives within the procedure, the alternative selected (from the agenda selected) will be within the uncovered set of the uncovered set. Our result follows from repeated application of this construction. Intuitively, the procedure constructed consists of requiring agents to vote on how they should vote and so on.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580050030
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Group decision making under uncertainty a note on the aggregation of “ordinal probabilities” (1986)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 21 (1986), S. 155-161 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper is a first attempt to study the problem of aggregation of individual ordinal probabilistic beliefs in an Arrowian framework. We exhibit some properties an aggregation rule must fulfil; in particular we prove the existence of a “quasi-dictator”.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00127192
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game (2000)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 48 (2000), S. 129-137 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Two-player ; Borda electoral competition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this note we introduce the notion of K–player additive extension of a symmetric two-player game and prove a result relating the equilibria in mixed strategies in the two games. Then we apply the result to the Borda electoral competition game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005256424944
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Covering relations, closest orderings and hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments (1991)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 8 (1991), S. 355-363 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We show that the Slater's set of a tournament, i.e. the set of the top elements of the closest orderings, is a subset of the top cycle of the uncovered set of the tournament. We also show that the covering relation is related to the hamiltonian bypaths of a strong tournament in that if x covers y, then there exists an hamiltonian bypath from x to y.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00183046
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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