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Notes: Summary Subjects tracked intervals in a synchronization paradigm at interval durations of 180, 210, 240, 270, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, and 1,000 ms. The variability of intertap intervals (ITIs) shows a sudden increase near 300 ms. This increase is interpreted as indicating the transition from automatic to controlled movement. It is suggested that the sudden change in the variability of ITIs does not reflect the operation of different timing mechanisms at short and long intervals, but differences in the way in which attentional processes come to bear on movement initiation for different interval durations. In contrast to previous findings reported in the literature, a U-shaped function between interval duration and variability in the 300-to-1,000-ms range was not observed.

Notes: Abstract The Simon effect is the performance advantage for spatially corresponding, compared to non-corresponding, target-response ensembles when the location of the target is task irrelevant. In four experiments, we tested the predictions of the attention-shift account of the Simon effect. In all experiments, subjects made choice responses with respect to the identity of a central target that followed a spatially non-informative peripheral precue. The first experiment showed a Simon effect away from the precue when the precue was a go/no-go signal: responses to spatially non-corresponding precue-response pairs were faster than responses to spatially corresponding precue-response pairs. The results of the second experiment suggested that this “reverse” Simon effect was not due to inhibition. In the third experiment, a secondary working memory task required the encoding, and later recall, of “oddball” precues. Although the Simon effect was absent, larger Simon effects towards the precue (i.e., responses were faster to spatially corresponding, compared to non-corresponding, precue-response ensembles) were correlated with poorer performance on the memory task. In the last experiment, the identity of completely non-informative precues was congruent, incongruent, or unrelated to the identity of the target. With precues that were unrelated to the identity of the target, there was a Simon effect towards the precues. Conversely, the Simon effect occurred away from the precue when the identity of the precue was related to that of the target. The findings suggest that a shift of attention alone is not sufficient to produce the Simon effect. Rather, the shift of attention must originate from an intentionally defined object. The results are discussed within a framework that integrates the attention-shift and referential-coding hypotheses.

Notes: Summary In this paper we attempt to formalize the idea that a mechanism that involves multilateral communication between buyers and sellers may be dominated by one that involves simple bilateral communication. To do this we consider the well known problem in which a seller tries to sell a single unit of output to a group ofN buyers who have independently distributed private valuations. Our arguments hinge on two considerations. First, buyers communicate their willingness to negotiate with the seller sequentially, and second, buyers have the option of purchasing the good from some alternative supplier. It is shown that the seller cannot improve upon a procedure in which she offers the good to each buyer in turn at a fixed price. The seller reverts to multilateral communication if possible, only when no buyer is willing to pay the fixed price. In reasonable environments buyers will be too impatient to wait for the outcome of a multilateral negotiation and all communications will be bilateral. In many problems in mechanism design, informed traders have no alternative to participation in the mechanism that is offered by its designer. The best mechanism from the designer's point of view is then the one that is most efficient at extracting informational rents, that is, a simple auction. In a competitive environment it is likely to be costly for buyers to participate in an auction or any other multilateral selling scheme in which the seller must process information from many different buyers because alternative trading opportunities will be disappearing during the time that the seller is collecting this information. Buyers might be willing to participate in an auction, but only if they could be guaranteed that the competition that they face will not eliminate too much of their surplus. At the other extreme to the auction is a simple fixed price selling scheme 1. The seller simply waits until he meets a buyer whose valuation is high enough, given the opportunities that exist in the rest of the market, for him to be willing to pay this price. The seller extracts the minimum of the buyer's informational rents since the price that a buyer pays is independent of his valuation. Yet the seller might like this scheme if adding a second bidder to the process makes it very difficult for him to find a buyer with a valuation high enough to want to participate. In the presence of opportunity costs, the seller faces a trade-off between his ability to extract buyers informational rents and his ability to find buyers who are willing to participate in any competitive process. In practice this trade-off will impose structure on the method that is used to determine a price. In markets where there are auctions, limits are put on buyer participation. In tobacco auctions bids are submitted at a distinct point in time from buyers who are present at that time. In real estate auctions time limits are put on the amount of time the seller will wait before making a decision. These restrictions on participation are presumably endogenously selected by the seller (possibly in competition with other mechanism designers) with this trade-off in mind. On the other hand, markets in which objects appear to trade at a fixed price are rarely so simple. A baker with a fixed supply of fresh bagels is unlikely to collect bids from buyers and award the bagels to the high bidder at the end of the day. Buyers are unlikely to be willing to participate in such a scheme since they can buy fresh bagels from a competitor down the street. Yet despite the fact that bagels sell at a fixed price throughout the day, most bakers are more than willing to let it be known that they will discount price at the end of the day on any bagels that they have not yet sold. Selling used cars presents a similar problem. Each potential buyer for the used car is likely to have inspected a number of alternatives, and is likely to know the prices at which these alternative can be obtained. A seller who suggests that buyers submit a bid, then wait until the seller is sure that no higher offer will be submitted is asking buyers to forgo these alternative opportunities with no gain to themselves. To avoid the rigidity of the pure fixed price scheme most used cars are sold for a fixed price or best offer. These examples suggest that the best selling mechanism may involve a complex interplay between participation and surplus extraction considerations. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple formalism within which the factors that determine the best contract can be evaluated. We consider the best known environment from the point of view of auction design in which there are a large number of buyers with independent private valuations for a unit of an indivisible commodity that is being sold by a single supplier who acts as the mechanism designer. We modify this standard problem in two critical ways. First, we assume that the seller meets the potential buyers sequentially rather than all at once. Secondly we assume that buyers have a valuable alternative that yields them a sure surplus. This creates a simple bidding cost that is effectively the expected loss in surplus (created by the disappearance of outside alternatives) that the buyer faces during the time that he spends negotiating with the seller. These simple assumptions allow us to calculate the impact of competition and communication costs using completely standard arguments from the mechanism design literature. We are able to show that with these assumptions the seller's expected surplus will be highest if the object is sold according to the following modified fixed price scheme: the seller contacts each of the potential buyers in turn and either offers to negotiate or announces that he no longer wishes to trade. If he offers to negotiate and the buyer agrees, the buyer immediately has the option of trading for sure with the seller at a fixed price set ex ante. If the buyer does not wish to pay this fixed price, he may submit an alternative bid. The seller will then continue to contact new buyers, returning to trade with the buyer only if no buyer wishes to pay the fixed price and no higher bid is submitted. It will be clear that in our environment, both the simple fixed price scheme and the simple auction are feasible. The simple auction prevails when the fixed price is set equal to the maximum possible valuation, while the simple fixed price scheme occurs when the fixed price is set so that buyers are willing to participate if and only if they are willing to pay the fixed price. Our results will show that a simple auction in never optimal for the seller. The seller can always strictly improve his payoff by moving to a scheme in which there is some strictly positive probability that trade will occur at the fixed price. On the other hand, there are reasonable circumstances in which the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than the one she gets by selling at a fixed price. It is shown that for any positive participation cost, there is a large, but finite, number of potential buyers so that the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than what she gets by selling at a fixed price. Two simple, but important continuity results are also illustrated. As the cost of participation in the mechanism increases (decreases), the probability with which the seller's unit of output is sold at a fixed price goes to one (zero) in the best modified fixed price mechanism for the seller. Our paper is not the first to generate such a modified fixed price scheme. Both McAfee and McMillan (1988) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) come up with similar schemes for the case in which the seller must bear a fixed cost for each new buyer that she contacts. There are two essential differences between our model and theirs. First, as the cost is interpreted as the opportunity cost of participation in the mechanism, it is reasonable to imagine that the seller advertises the mechanism ex ante. Another way

Notes: Summary This paper compares the performance of three pricing institutions in a decentralized matching model in which random matching occurs. In the first, sellers make public ex ante commitments to trade at pre-specified prices before matching occurs. In the second, the buyer and seller engage in an alternating offer bargaining game once a match has occurred. In the final pricing institution, one party is chosen at random to make a take it or leave it price offer. The steady state equilibrium with ex ante pricing pareto dominates the steady state equilibrium with ex post take it or leave it offers, which in turn pareto dominates the steady state equilibrium with alternating offers. As the discount factor goes to one, the equilibrium with ex ante pricing generates participation rates that tend toward the pareto efficient level. The ex post pricing institutions generate participation rates that are bounded away from efficient levels. The surplus loss associated with switching from ex ante pricing to take it or leave it offers is small when the discount factor is close to one. Contrary to many models of decentralized trade, ex post pricing institutions encourage too much search by buyers.

Notes: This work investigates the rotational dynamics of rigid and partially flexible macromolecules in solution by means of Brownian dynamics simulation techniques. In a previous study by Diaz et al. [J. Chem. Phys. 87, 6021 (1987)] on the rotational correlation functions of rigid models, the effect on rotational dynamics from pure rotations of the model's elements has been neglected due to the difficulty of introducing rotational constraints in the simulations. We present expressions for rotational constraints in a rigid dimer system, which makes it possible to completely describe the translational, rotational, and coupled translational–rotational motions for interacting spherical Brownian particles by employing the generalized algorithm of Dickinson et al. [J. Chem. Soc. Faraday Trans. 2 81, 591 (1985)]. Theoretical studies indicate, and our simulation calculations confirm, that the pure rotational effects are appreciable. The torque constraint expressions are verified by comparison of the simulation results to the exact analytical results for the rigid dimer system. The torque constraint expressions also allow us to examine the effects of flexibility on the rotational correlation functions for a dimer system.

Notes: Beginning with the molecular-based Fokker–Planck equation obtained previously [M. H. Peters, J. Chem. Phys. 110, 528 (1999); J. Stat. Phys. 94, 557 (1999)], the Smoluchowski diffusion equation is derived here to describe the spatial and orientational dynamics of molecularly structured macromolecules near molecularly structured surfaces. The formal scaling and perturbation methods employed allow the establishment of definite limits on the use of the Smoluchowski equation when surfaces are present. It is shown that the Smoluchowski equation reduces to that given previously [D. W. Condiff and J. S. Dahler, J. Chem. Phys. 44, 3988 (1966)] in the absence of external surfaces. A specific example application is given involving a spherical macromolecule with electrostatic charge segments near a planar surface with an arbitrary charge distribution. Finally, we show that the short-time solution to the Smoluchowski equation obtained here yields a Brownian dynamics method consistent with that given previously [E. Dickinson, S. A. Allison, and J. A. McCammon, J. Chem. Soc. Faraday Trans. 2 81, 591 (1985)] for orientable, interacting Brownian particles. This study has applications to problems involving site-specific adsorption of orientable, structured Brownian particles, such as association or adsorption of biological macromolecules to cellular surfaces and enzyme–substrate docking kinetics, to name a few. © 2000 American Institute of Physics.