Publication Date:
2014-02-26
Description:
In this paper, we study the efficiency of Nash equilibria for a sequence of nonatomic routing games. We assume that the games are played consecutively in time in an online fashion: by the time of playing game $i$, future games $i+1,\dots,n$ are not known, and, once players of game $i$ are in equilibrium, their corresponding strategies and costs remain fixed. Given a sequence of games, the cost for the sequence of Nash equilibria is defined as the sum of the cost of each game. We analyze the efficiency of a sequence of Nash equilibria in terms of competitive analysis arising in the online optimization field. Our main result states that the online algorithm $\sl {SeqNash}$ consisting of the sequence of Nash equilibria is $\frac{4n}{2+n}$-competitive for affine linear latency functions. For $n=1$, this result contains the bound on the price of anarchy of $\frac{4}{3}$ for affine linear latency functions of Roughgarden and Tardos [2002] as a special case. Furthermore, we analyze a problem variant with a modified cost function that reflects the total congestion cost, when all games have been played. In this case, we prove an upper bound of $\frac{4n}{2+n}$ on the competitive ratio of $\sl {SeqNash}$. We further prove a lower bound of $\frac{3n-2}{n}$ of $\sl {SeqNash}$ showing that for $n=2$ our upper bound is tight.
Keywords:
ddc:000
Language:
English
Type:
reportzib
,
doc-type:preprint
Format:
application/pdf
Format:
application/pdf
Format:
application/postscript
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